1864 Jan - Mar

The Construction of Confederate Defenses on Rocky Face Ridge and Mount Rachel.
By: Kevin McAuliff

Dalton
, approximately thirty miles southeast of Chattanooga, lies to the east of Rocky Face Ridge, a long north-south formation deriving its name from the rock cliffs on its west face.  The Ridge, always a visible presence, effectively screened Dalton from approach from the northwest, where Federal troops were preparing to advance following the Battle of Missionary Ridge.  Rocky Face was pierced by only two passes, Mill Creek Gap and Dug Gap.  The primary route between Chattanooga and Dalton was through Mill Creek Gap, just northwest of town, a deep defile through which ran Mill Creek and both the railroad and the wagon road to Chattanooga.  Also known as “Buzzards Roost,” Mill Creek Gap was guarded by steep, rocky cliffs on both sides.  To the west of Rocky Face Ridge lay Mill Creek Valley.

 

About three and a half miles to the south, Dug Gap, so named from excavations that made it passable, accommodated a narrow, steep dirt track.  The only other approach to Dalton was around the north end of Rocky Face, where Harris Gap led between Rocky Face and Cohutta Ridge to its north into Crow Valley, which extended southwards towards Dalton.  The eastern edge of Crow Valley was marked by an unnamed line of low ridges, beyond which Hamilton Mountain rose to the east.  Immediately to the south of Hamilton Mountain, Mount Rachel looked over the junction of the Western & Atlantic Railroad, which led northeast from Atlanta to Chattanooga, and the East Tennessee Railroad, which branched northward to Cleveland, Tennessee, roughly parallel to the Cleveland Road.

 

To a great extent, Dalton’s topography, as described above, shaped the events that took place there.

 

When news of the Confederate route at Missionary Ridge in November of 1863 reached Dalton, many residents began to prepare for evacuation.  The Union Army had penetrated deep into Confederate territory, and General Grant (USA) was preparing to continue the advance.  Dalton was of particular value to the invaders, since Mill Creek Gap afforded passage from Grant’s position in Chattanooga into the interior of the State of Georgia, and the Western & Atlantic Railroad line, which passed through the Gap and into the City, would transport supplies to whichever side in the contest controlled it, and led to Atlanta, an important strategic position deep in the heart of the Confederacy.

 

After Missionary Ridge, the Army of Tennessee (CSA) retreated to Dalton, and occupied the City.  There, General Bragg requested President Davis to be relieved of his duties.  He relinquished command in early December of 1863, and his temporary replacement, General Hardee, remained until succeeded by General Johnston late in the same month.  Upon assuming command, Johnston immediately set about re-equipping the troops and improving their morale.  He took advantage of the ridges near Dalton, and fortified them to defend from attacks from the west and north.

 

General Grant sent General Sherman to attack Johnston’s Army of Tennessee in North Georgia, and to penetrate as far into the interior of the State as possible.  On May 4, Sherman ordered his armies into position, and by May 7, 1864, his forces had begun to move against Johnston, whose troops took up defensive positions on Rocky Face Ridge and in Crow Valley.

 

Sherman concentrated on logistics, since the fortified cliffs made the Gap virtually impregnable, and Johnston’s men had dammed Mill Creek, flooding the Gap and rendering it impassable.  Sherman ordered McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee to proceed south through Mill Creek Valley to Snake Creek Gap to sever the railroad line at Resaca, just south of Dalton, and to Johnston’s rear.  To distract Johnston, General Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland moved against Tunnel Hill to the west of Rocky Face, while General Schofield approached Dalton from the north.

 

On May 8, Union forces seized Blue Mountain and established a signal tower on its summit just northwest of Rocky Face Ridge, and with a commanding view of the Ridge and the Gap.  Howard’s IV Corps began the ascent of the unfortified northern tip of Rocky Face, and moved southward along the narrow crest toward the fortified Confederate positions, while Schofield’s Army of the Ohio advanced against Confederate positions in Crow Valley.  That afternoon, General Geary’s Division in Mill Creek Valley launched an unsuccessful assault on Confederate positions at Dug Gap, and Union troops tried further unsuccessful probes over the course of the next two days.

 

On May 9, Federal forces reached the crest of the north end of Rocky Face Ridge and advanced southward, but were defeated, with considerable casualties on both sides, when they encountered Stevenson’s (CSA) line at the point where it began its descent across the face of the ridge into Crow Valley.

 

Skirmishing continued, as Sherman probed the Confederate line without success.  Convinced that he could not penetrate Rocky Face’s defences, Sherman turned his army south through Mill Creek Valley, to join McPherson at Snake Creek Gap, leaving a small contingent behind to distract the Confederates from his move.

 

On May 12, upon discovering that Sherman was directing most of his forces south to Resaca, to Johnston’s rear, Johnston withdrew from Rocky Face Ridge and Dalton to deploy in previously prepared positions near Resaca.  By daybreak on the 13th, Confederate troops had completely withdrawn, and Sherman’s troops who had remained at Mill Creek Gap occupied Dalton, which by then had been vacated by many of its panicked residents.

 

 

South End of Rocky Face Ridge north of Mill Creek, Stewart’s Division: Baker, Stovall, and Clayton’s Brigades 

 

Surviving defenses include a series of trenches, rifle pits, and a gun battery on the lower slopes; three demi-lunes on the southern flank, and stone fortifications and a trench at the military crest. These defended Mill Creek Gap.

 

Gen. Alexander P.  Stewart caused the construction of the fortifications at Mill Creek Gap, as stated in his Report of June 5, 1864:  “In fortifying the gap, I had caused lines of breast-heights for skirmishers to be constructed in front of the main lines of battle, artillery proof.  (T)he defenses of the gap were constructed by my division, Lieut.  John W. Glenn being the engineer officer superintending.... Capt. John A.  Averitt also, of Fifty-eighth Alabama, is entitled to the same distinction for the energy and skill displayed by him in fortifying Rocky Face on the north side of the gap and constructing practicable roads to the top of the mountain and along its summit.”   (Official Records of the War of Rebellion (=O.R.), Serial 74, p.  816.)

 

However, Gen. Joseph E.  Johnston’s statement on page 304 of his Narrative of Military Operations, Directed, During the Late War Between the States, by Joseph E.  Johnston (=Johnston, Narr.) (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1874) refers to “...Stewart’s and Bate’s divisions in Mill Creek Gap, in which they had constructed some slight defensive works...” suggests that Bate’s Division constructed the defenses on the crest of the Ridge where they were deployed, while Stewart fortified the actual Gap and the ascent of the Ridge to its north.  That Johnston referred to the fortifications as “some slight defensive works” is peculiar, since they stand to this day, and some are quite massive in places.

 

Presumably, construction of the defenseworks began shortly after Stewart was first positioned there on the morning of Feb. 23, 1864  (Johnston, Narr., p.  283).  Joseph Bogle’s account of Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis’ being shot while standing on the breastworks clearly references  fortifications in this vicinity (Some Recollections of the Civil War. Dalton, GA: Sons of Confederate Veterans, Joseph E. Johnston Camp #671, 1995, p.  8). (=Recollections)

 

Stewart’s Division was deployed here: Baker’s Brigade in the Gap, Stanford’s Miss Battery above, then Stovall’s Brigade, and Clayton’s Brigade near the top.  54th Ala. was in a skirmish line in front of Baker.

 

Federal skirmishers made “one threat of serious assault” in late afternoon of Feb 25, 1864  (Johnston, Narr., p.  284; also O.R., Serial 57, p. 478).  The Federals were driven back by the fire of a battery in front and musketry from above  (Johnston, Narr., p.  284.  Some Recollections of the Civil War contains eye-witness accounts of this incident by Joseph Bogle (pp.  7&8), William Lowndes (pp.  24&25), and J.B. Stubbs (pp.  25&26).

 

May 9, 1864 Federals assaulted Stewart in the Gap (Johnston, Narr., p. 306; O.R., Serial 72, pp. 846-847), and there were skirmishes on the 10th (Johnston, Narr., p. 308;O.R., Serial 72, pp. 847-848).  On both days, the Federals were driven back (Johnston, Narr., pp.  306, 308).  

 

Fort on Mount Rachel (Battery A)

 

Though somewhat eroded, this earthwork appears to be a redan with a raised earthen platform in the middle.  Battery A on Mt Rachel (along with the vanished Battery B [just to the east of City Park?]) was positioned to defend against Federal incursions along the East Tennessee  Railroad, the Cleveland Road, and other roads.  (O.R., Vol 32, Part 1, pp 38 & 472 cited by Marvin Sowder)  Confederate Map # N 214-1 from the National Archives (copy appended) shows distances to points along the Railroad, the Cleveland Road, and other roads by which Federal troops might advance on Dalton.

 

That this fortification was constructed as part of the efforts to defend Dalton is certain.  A computer search of the Official Records produced no mention of Mt. Rachel, however. According to an unpublished January 20, 1991 letter of Marvin Sowder, a well known local historian, to Mary Gene Dykes, it is likely that Capt. Evan Howell’s Georgia Battery, Martin’s Battalion, and Hardee’s Artillery Corps occupied this site.

 

There is no known evidence whether this site saw action or not.  An archaeological excavation might determine the answer.

 

The Crest of Rocky Face Ridge, Bate’s Division: Finley, Tyler and  Lewis’ Brigades 

 

This is a set of 31 intermittent linear configurations of stones extending along the military crest of west side of the ridge guarded Mill Creek Valley and the Gap.  In most cases, the breastworks have subsided to a height of one or two feet, at most, and are generally no wider than two feet, except in some places where they appear to have been inexpertly re-stacked.  The remains of these breastworks are often associated with natural rock formations that could serve as defensive positions.  The amount of stone suggests that the walls here were never very substantial.

 

Bates division was moved to these positions on May 5, 1864.  The positions might have been fortified earlier, perhaps when Stewart’s Division first took up positions in the Gap on Feb 23, 1864.  “In fortifying the gap, I had caused lines of breast-heights for skirmishers to be constructed in front of the main lines of battle, artillery proof.  (T)he defenses of the gap were constructed by my division, Lieut.  John W. Glenn being the engineer officer.  (June 5, 1864 Report of Maj. Gen. Alexander P.  Stewart, C.S. Army, commanding division, of operations May 7-27 in the Official Records of the War of Rebellion, Series 1, vol. 38, Part 3, The Atlanta Campaign, Chapter L, p.  816.)

 

It may also be possible that Bate’s troops built the defenses, which were occupied by Lewis, Tyler, and Finley’s Brigades.

 

On May 9, 1864, sharp attacks were made on Bate’s positions.  The actions of the day, according to Sherman, “attained the dimensions of a battle.” On the 10th, near night, an “especially spirited” attack was made on Bate’s position “on the hill-side facing the gap on the south.”  (Johnston, Narr., 306-308) Davis (USA) and Butterfield’s (USA) Divisions were directly in front of Bate’s, and may have been among the attackers.  The enemy was completely exposed, and driven back.  (Johnston, Narr., 306-307).

 

North End of Rocky Face Ridge South of Mill Creek Stewart’s Division:  Gibson’s Brigade; Fenner’s LA Battery in Redoubt Winans; Oliver’s Eufala Battery in Redoubt Fisk 

 

This complex of fortifications includes two earthen Redoubts, Fisk and Winans, linked by a curtain wall, now largely destroyed, and a series of six earthen artillery demi-lunes west of, and parallel to the curtain wall linking Redoubts Winans and Fisk.  A set of what appear to be large stone terraces adjacent to the demi-lune site was very likely a set of stone fortifications, as indicated by archaeological investigations that revealed that the soil behind the walls is alluvial, and must have eroded off the hillside above.  Three of the six walls of the fortification are pierced by gaps that may have allowed the passage of artillery pieces and troops. To the north of the demi-lunes is a stone breastwork.

 

Redoubt Fisk is a battery containing two gun positions.  Perhaps originally constructed as a redan, a third (southern) flank appears to have been added later.  Stone revetments remain in the parapet.  A dugout position with a traverse lies to the rear of the battery position.  Redoubt Winans is in excellent condition, with substantial intact stone revetments. The series of demi-lunes is located to the west of Winans and the remaining curtain wall, and descends the spur of the ridge.  To their north is a stone breastwork.

 

Gen. Alexander P.  Stewart caused the construction of the fortifications at Mill Creek Gap, as stated in his Report of June 5, 1864:

 

“In fortifying the gap, I had caused lines of breast-heights for skirmishers to be constructed in front of the main lines of battle, artillery proof.  (T)he defenses of the gap were constructed by my division, Lieut.  John W. Glenn being the engineer officer superintending.... Capt.  John A.  Averitt also, of Fifty-eighth Alabama, is entitled to the same distinction for the energy and skill displayed by him in fortifying Rocky Face on the north side of the gap and constructing practicable roads to the top of the mountain and along its summit.” (June 5, 1864 Report of Maj. Gen. Alexander P.  Stewart, C.S. Army, commanding division, of operations May 7-27 in O.R, Series 1, vol. 38, Part 3, The Atlanta Campaign, Chapter L, p.  816.)

 

However, Gen.  Joseph E.  Johnston’s statement on page 304 of his Narrative of Military Operations, Directed, During the Late War Between the States, by Joseph E.  Johnston refers to “...Stewart’s and Bate’s divisions in Mill Creek Gap, in which they had constructed some slight defensive works...” suggests that Bate’s Division constructed the defenses on the crest of the Ridge where they were deployed, while Stewart fortified the actual Gap and the ascent of the Ridge to its north.  That Johnston referred to the fortifications as “some slight defensive works” is peculiar, since they stand to this day, and are quite massive in places.

 

Presumably, construction of the defenseworks began shortly after Stewart was first positioned there on Feb 23, 1864. The morning of Feb 25, 1864 Federal skirmishers engaged Stewart’s and Breckenridge’s Divisions in the “eastern outlet” of the Gap.  It is possible that these positions were involved (Johnston, Narr., p. 283).

 

According to William R. Scaife in The Campaign for Atlanta (Atlanta: McNaughton & Gunn, Inc. 1993) p.19, the heaviest Federal attack in the Dalton area was made by Davis’ 2nd Div on May 8th, and his map (p.  27) shows it as aimed straight at the 14th Louisiana, just in front of Gibson’s Brigade in the demi-lunes and curtain wall between Redoubts Winans and Fisk.

 

Significance of Rocky Face Ridge

 

Union General Sherman is generally believed to have made his decision to launch the Atlanta Campaign in the Clisby Austin House in Tunnel Hill, within sight of Rocky Face Ridge.  On May 8, 1864, he began the assault on Rocky Face Ridge, a heavily fortified natural barrier between Sherman’s forces and the town of Dalton, GA.  The Union attack on Rocky Face Ridge and Dalton marks the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign and the March to the Sea. 


BATTLE OF DALTON MAP
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 Cleburne’s Proposal to Arm the Slaves

by Robert Jenkins

Dalton-Whitfield Civil War

150th Commemoration Committee

     On Thursday, July 14th, at 10:00 A.M., the Georgia Historical Society will be conducting a dedication service to unveil a marker commemorating Confederate General Patrick R. Cleburne’s proposal to arm slaves in exchange for their freedom.  Cleburne’s plan was to provide manpower for the South to face the ever-increasing Federal Army which was beginning to recruit black soldiers and which continued to swell its ranks with immigrants, particularly from Germany and other parts of Europe.  It was becoming increasingly clear to Southern officers during the winter of 1863-64 that the South was fast running out of men to continue the War.  After much thought and discussion among several like-minded junior officers, Cleburne wrote out his proposal while the Confederate Army of Tennessee remained in camps in and around Dalton.  On January 2nd, 1864, Cleburne presented it to Commanding General Joseph E. Johnston, and the Division and Corps Commanders of the Army of Tennessee during a meeting at Johnston’s headquarters, the Cook-Huff House located at 314 North Selvidge Street.

      This marker along with Dalton’s key role in African-American Civil War history provides tremendous irony.  While the Confederate High Command in Richmond and in Dalton dismissed the proposal as outrageous, in 1864 U.S. armies were beginning to recruit and deploy Black troops in mass.  By the Spring of 1864, Dalton had fallen into Federal hands and, during the Summer of 1864, many runaway slaves from Northwest Georgia found their way into Chattanooga to join the ranks of the 14th and 44th United States Colored Infantry.  Had Cleburne’s proposal been taken seriously and adopted in January 1864, it is possible that some of these men could have served for the South in exchange for their freedom.  Instead, they fought for liberty on the side of the North for the liberation of all people, not solely for their personal freedom.  In August and October 1864, these two Black Regiments saw action in Dalton in two separate events, the only fighting in the State of Georgia during the Civil War in which African-American troops were engaged.  By war’s end, over 200,000 African-Americans enlisted for the North. 

     Before the year was out, General Joseph E. Johnston, who had commanded the Confederate forces in Dalton and who had dismissed the proposal, would be dismissed from command, General Cleburne along with many of the persons who signed it, would be killed in combat, General William Henry Talbot (W.H.T.) “Shot Pouch” Walker, who was the chief opponent of the proposal, along with many others who opposed it, would also be killed in combat, and a year later, and President Jefferson Davis, who was ultimately responsible for dismissing the proposal to free those in captivity in exchange for their Confederate service, was himself made captive (jailed) for two years for his Confederate service.

     Ironically, the South eventually passed a bill to arm the slaves.  In February 1865, Davis appointed Robert E. Lee as Commander of all Confederate Armies, not just those in Virginia, and Lee’s first act was to recommend Cleburne’s proposal to arm slaves in exchange for their freedom.  In March 1865, just weeks before the end of the War, the Confederate Congress passed legislation approving the use of slaves in the armies, but the bill did not promise freedom in exchange for service as had been recommended by Cleburne and Lee.  While some have estimated the number of blacks who served in the Confederacy at 32,000, (a figure derived from post-war pension applications which likely included applications for servants and laborers as very few black Confederates were used in combat roles), it is clear that the decision to arm the slaves for the South came too little and too late and it failed to yield any measurable results for the Confederacy.

Confederate General Patrick Cleburne

 Cleburne’s Proposal Letter:

Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#24
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]

JANUARY 2, 1864

[To:  Joseph E. Johnston, General Commanding the Confederate forces at Dalton, Ga.]

Commanding General,
The Corps, Division, Brigade, and Regimental Commanders of the Army of Tennessee

General:

Moved by the exigency in which our country is now placed we take the liberty of laying before you, unofficially, our views on the present state of affairs.  The subject is so grave, and our views so new, we feel it a duty both to you and the cause that before going further we should submit them for your judgment and receive your suggestions in regard to them.  We therefore respectfully ask you to give us an expression of your views in the premises.  We have now been fighting for nearly three years, have spilled much of our best blood, and lost, consumed, or thrown to the flames an amount of property equal in value to the specie currency of the world.  Through some lack in our system the fruits of our struggles and sacrifices have invariably slipped away from us and left us nothing but long lists of dead and mangled.  Instead of standing defiantly on the borders of our territory or harassing those of the enemy, we are hemmed in to-day into less than two-thirds of it, and still the enemy menacingly confronts us at every point with superior forcesOur soldiers can see no end to this state of affairs except in our own exhaustion; hence, instead of rising to the occasion, they are sinking into a fatal apathy, growing weary of hardships and slaughters which promise no results. In this state of things it is easy to understand why there is a growing belief that some black catastrophe is not far ahead of us, and that unless some extraordinary change is soon made in our condition we must overtake it…We can see three great causes operating to destroy us:  First, the inferiority of our armies to those of the enemy in point of numbers; second, the poverty of our single source of supply in comparison with his several sources; third, the fact that slavery, from being one of our chief sources of strength at the commencement of the war, has now become, in a military point of view, one of our chief sources of weakness.

The enemy already opposes us at every point with superior numbers, and is endeavoring to make the preponderance irresistible.  President Davis, in his recent message, says the enemy "has recently ordered a large conscription and made a subsequent call for volunteers, to be followed, if ineffectual by a still further draft."  In addition, the President of the United States announces that "he has already in training an army of 100,000 negroes as good as any troops," and every fresh raid he makes and new slice of territory he wrests from us will add to this force…Apart from the assistance that home and foreign prejudice against slavery has given to the North, slavery is a source of great strength to the enemy in a purely military point of view, by supplying him with an army from our granaries; but it is our most vulnerable point, a continued embarrassment, and in some respects an insidious weakness…To prevent raids we are forced to scatter our forces, and are not free to move and strike like the enemy; his vulnerable points are carefully selected and fortified depots.  Ours are found in every point where there is a slave to set free…

Like past years, 1864 will diminish our ranks by the casualties of war, and what source of repair is there left us?  We therefore see in the recommendations of the President only a temporary expedient, which at the best will leave us twelve months hence in the same predicament we are in now…As between the loss of independence and the loss of slavery, we assume that every patriot will freely give up the latter — give up the negro slave rather than be a slave himself…

Our country has already some friends in England and France, and there are strong motives to induce these nations to recognize and assist us, but they cannot assist us without helping slavery, and to do this would be in conflict with their policy for the last quarter of a century…The measure we propose will strike dead all John Brown fanaticism, and will compel the enemy to draw off altogether or in the eyes of the world to swallow the Declaration of Independence without the sauce and disguise of philanthropy.  This delusion of fanaticism at an end, thousands of Northern people will have leisure to look at home and to see the gulf of despotism into which they themselves are rushing.

The immediate effect of the emancipation and enrollment of negroes on the military strength of the South would be:  To enable us to have armies numerically superior to those of the North, and a reserve of any size we might think necessary; to enable us to take the offensive, move forward, and forage on the enemy.  It would open to us in prospective another and almost untouched source of supply, and furnish us with the means of preventing temporary disaster, and carrying on a protracted struggle.  It would instantly remove all the vulnerability, embarrassment, and inherent weakness which result from slavery.  The approach of the enemy would no longer find every household surrounded by spies; the fear that sealed the master's lips and the avarice that has, in so many cases, tempted him practically to desert us would alike be removed.  There would be no recruits awaiting the enemy with open arms, no complete history of every neighborhood with ready guides, no fear of insurrection in the rear, or anxieties for the fate of loved ones when our armies moved forward.  The chronic irritation of hope deferred would be joyfully ended with the negro, and the sympathies of his whole race would be due to his native South…For many years, ever since the agitation of the subject of slavery commenced, the negro has been dreaming of freedom, and his vivid imagination has surrounded that condition with so many gratifications that it has become the paradise of his hopes.  To attain it he will tempt dangers and difficulties not exceeded by the bravest soldier in the field.  The hope of freedom is perhaps the only moral incentive that can be applied to him in his present condition.  It would be preposterous then to expect him to fight against it with any degree of enthusiasm, therefore we must bind him to our cause by no doubtful bonds; we must leave no possible loop-hole for treachery to creep in.  The slaves are dangerous now, but armed, trained, and collected in an army they would be a thousand fold more dangerous; therefore when we make soldiers of them we must make free men of them beyond all question, and thus enlist their sympathies also.  We can do this more effectually than the North can now do, for we can give the negro not only his own freedom, but that of his wife and child, and can secure it to him in his old home…

Will the slaves fight?...If, contrary to the training of a lifetime, they can be made to face and fight bravely against their former masters, how much more probable is it that with the allurement of a higher reward, and led by those masters, they would submit to discipline and face dangers.

It is said Republicanism cannot exist without the institution.  Even were this true, we prefer any form of government of which the Southern people may have the molding, to one forced upon us by a conqueror… It is said slavery is all we are fighting for, and if we give it up we give up all.  Even if this were true, which we deny, slavery is not all our enemies are fighting for.  It is merely the pretense to establish sectional superiority and a more centralized form of government, and to deprive us of our rights and liberties…, and there is danger that this concession to common sense may come too late.

P. R. Cleburne, major-general, commanding division
D. C. Govan, brigadier-general
John E. Murray, colonel, Fifth Arkansas
G. F. Baucum, colonel, Eighth Arkansas
Peter Snyder, lieutenant-colonel, commanding Sixth and Seventh Arkansas
E. Warfield, lieutenant-colonel, Second Arkansas
M. P. Lowrey, brigadier-general
A. B. Hardcastle, colonel, Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi 
F. A. Ashford, major, Sixteenth Alabama
John W. Colquitt, colonel, First Arkansas
Rich. J. Person, major, Third and Fifth Confederate
G. S. Deakins, major, Thirty-fifth and Eighth Tennessee
J. H. Collett, captain, commanding Seventh Texas
J. H. Kelly, brigadier-general, commanding Cavalry Division 

Source:  Official Records of the War of the Rebellion

This remarkable and controversial proposal from one of the Confederacy's most well-respected field commanders may have been a contributing factor to why Patrick Cleburne was never promoted to higher levels of command within the Confederate Army.


 

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